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Environmental scanning is the process of acquiring , interpreting and controlling 
flows of environmental information by the organizations in order not to be blindsided 
by threats, unprepared for opportunities, or ineffective in managing interdependencies 
with resource controllers and other important stakeholders. High velocity environment 
refers to a phenomenon in industries that exhibit perpetual state of change. The 
change triggering events are so dramatic that major portions of prior cognitive 
frameworks of the environment, which are traditionally highly resistant to change, are 
rendered ineffective in helping managers make sense of and act within the 
environment. In high velocity environments, quick adaptation to the environmental 
changes which in turn require quick noticing and interpretation of the environment 
stimuli, is a prerequisites for survival. This paper tries to   
understand the process of noticing and interpreting environment in an organization in 
a high velocity environment with the help of cognitive perspective of the environment 
where organizations enact on their environment.  
1. Environment 
Environment is infinite and includes everything outside the organization. However, it 
is generally considered to include only those aspects to which organization is sensitive 
and must respond to survive i.e. those which must be taken into account while making 
strategic decisions. Factors affecting strategy may arise from either outside or inside 
the organization, as well as from current or potential customers, competitors,   2
suppliers, or regulators. The three crucial elements that affect the nature of an 
organization’s environment are  
1.  complexity of the environment: the number and dissimilarity of environmental 
actors, as well as their degree of interconnection (Dess and Beard 1984) 
2.  resource dependence which determines an environment’s ability to sustain 
organizational growth (Starbuck 1976 as quoted in Sutcliffe, 2000) 
3.  dynamism or the speed with which the environment changes (Dess and Beard 
1984) 
Mintzberg et. al. (1998) describe ten different schools of thoughts but one of the 
common threads that link all the schools of thought is the acknowledgement of the 
importance of environment. The organizations are considered as using strategy to deal 
with changing environments.  
 
Organizations acquire, interpret, and control flows of environmental information in 
order not to be blindsided by threats, unprepared for opportunities, or ineffective in 
managing interdependencies with resource controllers and other important 
stakeholders (Sutcliffe, 2001).  Few managers would argue with the idea that the 
collection and analysis of information is one of the key elements in managerial 
decision making. Some scholars (e.g. Pfeffer and Salancick, 1978, 14; Starbuck and 
Milliken, 1988; Weick, 1974: 117 as quoted in Vodosek and Sutcliffe, 2000) argue 
that information gathering and processing are crucial to the success of the 
organization, even more crucial than strategic decision making itself. The activities 
relating to information processing serve other purposes also viz. help organizational 
members make sense of their activities (Daft and Weick 1984, Weick and Daft, 1983),   3
or act as symbols and signals that create meaning or legitimacy (Feldman and March 
1981, March and Sevon 1984).  
An idea of the importance of information processing can be gauged from the 
magnitude of spending on information collection. According to a report published by 
the American Marketing Association, in 200l, U.S. corporations spent $5.5 billion on 
market research alone--which doesn't include expenditures on software or other 
information technology (Sutcliffe and Weber 2003).  
If we have insights on what to pay attention to and what to ignore, it could then be 
used to pinpoint the type of data that needs to be collected and the type of analysis 
that needs to be done. Organizations could then save large amount of time and 
resources currently spent on collecting and analyzing data that never enter the 
decision making process. This has become particularly important in case of fast 
changing environments also known as high velocity environments. Over the last ten 
years researchers and practitioners have been equally intrigued by the prevalence of 
fast changes in the environment and the resulting turbulence.  
 
2. High Velocity Environment 
Hypercompetition or high velocity environments represent a state of competition with 
reduced periods of competitive advantage for firms and rapidly escalating levels of 
competition (Brown and Eisenhardt 1997, 1998), Eisenhardt and Bourgeois (1988), 
and D'Aveni (1994, 1995) suggest that hypercompetition is not a temporary phase in 
industries as have been studied in the past. It refers to a phenomenon in industries that 
exhibit perpetual state of change. The competition levels keep on escalating because 
of rapid changes in technology regulation and consumer preferences. These industries 
also have relative ease of entry and exit as a result of which new competitors emerge   4
overnight. The competitive advantage for firms in these industries is short lived as a 
result and hence, above average profits cannot be earned based on single innovation 
or resource advantage. The most significant threat is the steady pace of competence-
destroying change that occurs, and the limited ability of managers to foresee the 
nature of these changes (Brown and Eisenhardt 1998, Eisenhardt and Bourgeois 1989, 
D'Aveni 1994, Thomas 1996). Besides this uncertainty the firms in hypercompetitive 
industries face enormous complexity not only due to high number of elements 
constituting its environments but also because of unpredictable ways in which these 
elements interact (Bogner and Barr, 2000). 
 
The peculiar feature of high velocity environments is the interaction between the 
elements of dynamism and complexity. As complexity increases, uncertainty 
increases because it becomes difficult to understand the cause-effect relationship in 
both internal and external environments. The complexity arising from diverse 
workforce, global markets, dispersed production locations, distributed knowledge, 
government regulation etc. also increases the number of factors that must be taken 
into account. Add fast changes to these and what we end up with is the need to 
manage the resulting chaos.  
For example, firms that develop and sell computer hardware have seen an endless 
series of major shifts in the competitive environment since the mid-1970s. In the 
1990s, the rise of LAN-based networks, increasingly powerful microchips, the 
internet, and JAVA programming language, to name just a few, have combined to 
create multiple openings along the value chain that continue to interact with each 
other in unpredictable ways. The emerging technologies, unexpected user patterns, 
and complex interactions among variables that drive this turbulence produce   5
unforeseeable outcomes. Furthermore, the rapid pace of change, together with 
interactions throughout software, hardware, and related technologies, is expected to 
continue into the future (Bogner and Barr, 2000). 
 
The prevalence of high velocity environments is evident when we look at the 
necessity to increase the speed with which companies assess their competitive 
environment, develop new products, and bring them to market. In fact, the 
management press (e.g. Dimancescu and Dwenger 1996; Jones 1993; Meyer 1993; 
Stalk and Hout 1990; Vasey 1991as quoted in Vodosek and Sutcliffe, 2000) has 
identified the speed at which companies bring their product to market as one of the 
most critical issues for companies today. Empirical studies appear to support this 
contention. For example, Womack, Jones, and Roos (1990) have documented this 
importance of speed for competitiveness in the automobile industry. In addition, 
Eisenhardt and colleagues (Bourgeois and Eisenhardt 1988; Eisenhardt 1989; 
Eisenhardt and Tabrizi 1995; Schoonhoven, Eisenhardt, and Lyman 1990) have 
looked extensively at the effect of speed on competitiveness of companies in high-
velocity environments. They found that fast decision making by top decision makers 
based on rich real-time information (Bourgeois and Eisenhardt 1988; Eisenhardt 
1989) is closely linked to a company’s performance. These accounts provide evidence 
that today’s organizations operate in an “age of speed” which requires organizations 
both to make decisions faster and to implement them more quickly. (Vodosek and 
Sutcliffe 2000)  
Researchers are unanimous that these environments require more responsive form of 
organizing. Responsive organizations are characterized by sensitiveness to 
environmental stimuli and ability to act quickly.    Responsiveness not must means   6
being reactive; it also requires that the organization behave more proactively (Clair, 
Quinn and O’Neill, 2000). 
 
3. Limitations of Traditional Approaches of Assessing Environment 
Managers trying to make decisions in such environments find that these ongoing 
conditions do not conform to more established understandings of environmental 
scanning. The traditional approaches to assessment also known as linear adaptive 
models involve use of a checklist to assess the environment. They mainly involve 
finding out the governmental changes – new legislations, new enforcement priorities, 
competitive changes – adoption of new technologies, new competitors, price changes, 
new products, supplier changes – changes in input costs, supply changes, changes in 
number of suppliers, market changes – new uses of products, new markets, product 
obsolescence etc. (Power et al (1986)as quoted in Mintzberg et al (1998)- strategy 
safari p 29) or using some framework like porter’s five forces framework etc. 
(Pitkethly, 2003) 
 
Linear-adaptive models stress such factors as goals, plans, and actions that are 
designed to steer the organization towards its objectives. However, the linear-adaptive 
model is not well suited to understanding hypercompetitive industries since in the 
absence of well defined business models for projecting revenues, managers are unable 
to set concrete goals, let alone know when they have attained them. The situation is 
similar to the case of an industry starting ab initio (Anand, Hoffman, and Novak, 
1998). Managers in such industries operate on the edge of their ignorance. In 
hypercompetition the rapidly occurring and significant events radically undermine the 
usefulness of major concepts within prior cognitive frameworks of competition   7
(Reger and Palmer 1996). The events are so dramatic that major portions of prior 
cognitive frameworks of the environment, which are traditionally highly resistant to 
change, are rendered ineffective in helping managers make sense of and act within the 
environment. More specifically, we suggest that while cognitive frameworks are 
likely to remain rooted in some generalized understanding of product, technology, and 
firm identity, many of the traditional constructs managers use to anchor beliefs about 
the industry (input factors, buyer preferences, identity of rivals, substitutes, and 
potential entrants, and relevant resource accumulation) are no longer helpful markers 
on the cognitive maps used by managers to guide firms through the competitive 
environment. Managers do have a general understanding of which factors will have 
some importance for future competitive advantage and why; it is based on this level of 
understanding that managers identify the potential long-term profitability of a market 
and make commitments to new competitive positions. Beginning in the early stages of 
hypercompetition, however, the dynamics of market competition mean that there 
exists significant uncertainty ex ante about how those factors will be organized or 
about what roles particular factors will play in competition, and for how long. Thus, 
while firms know they need to make large resource allocations to a certain function, 
such as R&D, the environment is so uncertain that firms are unable to identify with a 
high degree of certainty which technical capabilities, or other investments, will be 
"winners" Managers must spend considerable energy in field construction, that is, in 
ensuring that the different elements that make up an organizational field (DiMaggio & 
Powell, 1983) meaningfully. So the checklist approach traditionally followed is not 
applicable. Managers in hypercompetition struggle to understand the spread of about a 
new product, service, organization, or industry through managers’ symbolic language   8
behavior.  They also find it difficult to manage the process by which key stakeholders 
accept a venture as appropriate and right.  
Porter’s five forces framework is not of much helpful either. Changes in technology 
and entry of a diverse set of new competitors mean that the factors of production in 
the market are constantly changing. This is in sharp contrast to the homogenizing, 
efficiency-seeking behavior that Structure-conduct-performance (which constitutes 
theoretical base for Porter’s five forces framework) models assume when they 
indicate markets tending toward a steady or equilibrium state (Bain 1959). The 
managers typically have difficulty articulating barriers, the intensity of competitive 
rivalry among firms, and even the relative power among and buyers.  This is because 
field boundaries in terms of markets, rivals, and partners are difficult to assess 
(Anand, Hoffman and  Novak 1998). Managers in hyperturbulent industries do not 
have relatively stable factors of production on which they can focus. Changes are 
quite large in scale and scope (major changes in technology, entry of powerful new 
competitors) and of long duration. Indeed, successful firms are those that can 
regularly disrupt the industry status quo (D'Aveni 1994). Yet, managers still must be 
able to assess the environment in such industries as the pioneering firms can have a 
tremendous impact on the trajectory of an industry’s evolution (Aldrich & Fiol, 1994). 
In such environments early successes are quickly amplified, while early failures are 
rapidly dampened. 
4. Why use Cognitive Framework for Environmental Scanning 
This paper deals with the question of how organizations know their environment and 
cognition, by definition, has to do with the “act or process of knowing” (random 
house dictionary). Cognitive science suggests that how individuals make sense of and   9
act within their environments is tied to their cognitive frameworks or mental models. 
These frameworks can be defined as mental representations of things or events 
(Weick 1990, 1995). They are developed over time through experience, vicarious 
learning, and direct communication from others (i.e., teaching) (Fiske and Taylor 
1991). The development of these frameworks is path dependent; the past shapes the 
template for understanding the future.  
Cognitive frameworks influence what is noticed by making some stimuli more salient 
than others; they provide rules and relationships that influence the interpretation of 
what is noticed, and they suggest what actions should be taken by which individuals 
(Galambos et al. 1986). When confronted with stimuli, these frameworks enable 
managers to "comprehend, understand, explain, attribute, extrapolate, and predict" 
(Starbuck and Milliken 1988 p. 51 as quoted in Bogner and Barr, 2000).  
Though essentially an individual-level concept, cognitive frameworks are influenced 
by the interactions individuals have with others. These interactions give rise to 
commonly shared ideas, or concepts. As interactions occur among a number of 
different individuals within a given social grouping, the commonly shared ideas begin 
to take on an existence of their own, independent of the individuals that created them, 
and we begin to talk about frameworks existing at higher levels. These "shared belief 
systems" make coordinated activity possible by providing a common framework for 
noticing and interpreting new stimuli and for coordinating appropriate action. For 
firms operating in a competitive marketplace, interactions that lead to shared 
frameworks occur among individuals within the firm. At the within-firm level, 
interactions among individuals give rise to firm-level frameworks. Over time, 
individuals within the firm share experiences and knowledge with one another, and a   10
base of common knowledge and "views of the world" begins to form. (Barr and Huff 
1997).  
 Research suggests that when exposed to similar stimuli, top managers in different 
organizations will form different interpretations of the same issue (e.g. Meyer, 1982). 
Daft and Weick (1984) argued that these differences may be, in part, the result of 
frameworks, or contexts, that direct information, attention, and interpretation. In other 
words, top managers' interpretations are a product of multiple sources of influence, 
and these sources may emanate from different levels of the managers' overall 
contexts. Thomas and McDaniel (1990) found that in addition to an organization-level 
context embodied in such factors as strategy, the structure of a top management team 
(a group-level contextual feature) accounted for interpretation variance across top 
managers from different organizations.  
As past research has shown (e.g., Milliken & Lant, 1991), top executives facing the 
same objective stimuli often perceive their organizations as facing differently defined 
environments. The importance of this observation to strategic management is that 
responses to an organization's environment, and ultimately, the organization's 
performance, are highly dependent on these different interpretations (Dutton & 
Duncan, 1987). Previous research has further demonstrated that these interpretations 
are susceptible to systematic biases and errors rooted in a variety of sources and levels 
of analysis (Thomas and.Shankster,1994).  
 
The traditional approaches to environmental scanning treat cognition as a black box 
i.e. do not acknowledge and appreciate the decoupling between availability of 
information from the issue of whether decision makers pay attention to it or not. 
Paying attention to information, in turn is decoupled from the issue of whether this   11
information becomes part of the decision making process (Vodosek and Sutcliffe 
2000). What information managers pay attention to and what information they ignore 
and why is largely unknown if we follow the rationalist traditional approaches to 
environmental scanning. Furthermore the mechanisms through which managers 
incorporate the information that they have focused on into their decision have to be 
explored in order to truly appreciate the problem of environmental scanning in high 
velocity environments.  
 
It is only the cognitive perspective with its interpretive and enactment stances that 
throws light on the actual process of how stimulus in the environment is noted and 
when it is taken till the decision making stage. It is hence obvious that the best answer 
about environmental scanning in high velocity environment would be found in 
cognitive perspective. Moreover as Rajagopal and Spreitzer (1997)contend “The only 
perspective in which the role of managerial cognitions …is explicit, the cognitive lens 
perspective….. Managerial cognitions are variously defined as knowledge structures, 
core beliefs, cause maps, and schemas ( as quoted in Walsh, 1995). In the cognitive 
model, the interpretive processes through which managers enact the 
environmental/organizational context are emphasized.” 
 
5. Cognitive Perspectives of Environment 
In addition to explaining the heterogeneity in behavior to same stimuli by similar 
firms, cognitive theories also expand our view of the environment. There are three 
perspectives of environment viz. objectivist, perceptual or interpretevist and 
enactment. The latter two can be said to be a part of the cognitive perspective.  
Objective Perspective   12
Under the objectivist perspective environment is said to consist things outside the 
organization. It includes every event and element which has any effect on the 
activities of the organization. Although, one can conceive an organization’s 
environment to encompass every event that affects it, only the crucial ones either in 
terms of magnitude of occurrence, or their impact or in terms of frequency of 
occurrence. There dimensions typically considered for analyzing the environment of 
the organization are  
•  stakeholders 
•  components 
•  attributes 
•  industry characteristics 
The environment is independent of the organization and its members. The 
dimensions mentioned above, events and the processes in the environment are 
concrete, measurable, and determinate. These can be objectively found out. Any 
relevant change in the environment requires changes in the organization and the 
organization needs to adapt for survival. The goal of managers is to adapt to things 
“out there”. 
Interpretevist Perspective 
The objectivist perspective considers that the data from the environment can be 
viewed and scanned without any cognitive limitations. However, the enormity of the 
environment brings to spotlight the cognitive limitations of the individuals and 
organizations. Though the environment generates the data, it can be converted into 
information for decision making which depends on the perception and interpretative 
schemas of the managers.  This perceptual or interpretive perspective brings to fore 
the importance of perceptions and interpretations. So the environmental data needs to   13
be interpreted and this equivocation needs to be reduced. The environment is still 
considered to be independent of the organization and its members, however, there is 
now a distinction between reality that exists out there, and what managers make of the 
data. The goal of managers is to reduce the complexity, uncertainty, and equivocation 
in scanning the environment. The focus, thus, shifts to improving accuracy of what 
managers’ see, improving their perceptions, reducing equivocation etc.    
An example would that of a game of twenty questions (based on Daft and Weick, 
1984). In this game one person leaves the room and the remaining people select a 
word that the person has to guess when he/she returns, and the only clue given about 
the word is whether it signifies an animal, vegetable, or mineral. The person trying to 
guess can ask up to 20 questions that can be answered in yes or no in an effort to 
guess what the word is. Each question is asked to find some new information about 
the correct word. It is the perception and interpretation of the person trying to guess 
the word that plays a decisive role. Organizations similarly try to find out what the 
consumer want through market surveys, personal interviews, demographics data etc. 
Here scanning is more a sort of discovery.  
Enactment Perspective 
The third perspective is enactment perspective. Here the dichotomy between the 
reality and the perception is more elaborate. Instead of recognizing the dichotomy 
between the organization and its environment, the dichotomy between the 
environment as a stream of experience and what managers’ make of this experience is 
recognized. Here the environment is considered to be an act of invention. This does 
not mean that there are no real objects. The environment is considered as an 
ambiguous field of experience devoid of threats and opportunities. The enacted 
environments contain real objects such as machines, pipes, valves etc. The existence   14
of these is not questioned. What is questioned is the significance and the meanings 
attached to these. A machine can be viewed as just consisting of atoms, another piece 
of metal etc, however, it is considered a machine for some purpose. People are said to 
exist in two worlds the world of events and things and the world of words about 
events and things. The central question in enactment perspective is the abstracting and 
symbolizing process that relates the two worlds. The process necessarily results in 
inaccurate map of the same reality because the words changes continuously and no 
two events can be said to be the same. The above two perspectives are not of much 
help when one moves from simple, observable processes to complicated 
interpretations of events spanning time and involving multiple observations, wherein 
the necessity of summarizing selecting, discarding and simplifying become 
prominent. As one deals with things that are not directly observable but must be 
inferred from observables what Kaplan (1964) calls type III concepts – constructs) 
there is no recourse but to use accumulated knowledge about how the world operates 
to make sense out of it. There are no meaning that world gives as valid. There are 
only created beliefs, more or less supported by what one considers as evidence, and 
held with more or less conviction or doubt. Environment is not inherently meaningful 
or predefined. 
In the above two perspectives the environment was said to exist independent of the 
observer. However, under enactment perspective it is recognized that “there is no 
methodological process by which one can confirm the existence of an object 
independent of the confirmatory process involving oneself.” (Weick 2001,p. 184) 
The meaning is created by the observer.  
There is no such thing as experience until the manager does something. Passive 
reception of a shower of inputs is not synonymous with having an experience.   15
Experience is a consequence of an activity. The manager literally wades into the 
swarm of “events” that surround him and actively tries to unrandomize them and 
impose some order. The manager acts physically in the environment, attends to some 
of it, ignores most of it, talks to other people about what they see and are doing. As a 
result the surroundings get sorted into variables and linkages and appear more orderly. 
(Weick , 1979, p 148) 
Hence “Information is a variable and becomes meaningful Decision makers give 
meaning to stimuli that was data before it became stimuli. Then they take actions 
which become input for their future actions and other’s actions.” (Sutcliffe, 2001) 
It is important to note the difference between enactment and perception/interpretation. 
Under interpretation there is a presumption that the object to perceive/interpret is 
evident (Weick, 1995, p.14)  No such presumption is made under enactment 
perspective.   
 
 
Unlike objectivist and perceptual perspective which presume a real material 
environment whose boundaries are clearly distinct from the concrete material 
organization here the boundaries are not given importance. What is inside and what is 
outside is clearly distinguished in the above two perspectives. The criterion often is 
legal ownership. However, the moment the notion of control separate from ownership 
is introduced confusion builds up about the boundary. This brings attention to shifting 
of boundaries. Similarly when other criterion like culture, identity and strategic 
priorities are introduced one would find the boundaries blurring further. The trends in 
corporate sector such as recent foci on processes and supply chain management have 
made the boundaries fuzzy. According to Weick (1977) “While the categories   16
external/internal or outside inside exist logically, they do not exist empirically. The 
outside or external world cannot be known.” Under enactment perspective, the notion 
of creation of environment through attentional processes shifts the focus from 
characteristics of objective external environment and the boundaries to the decisions 
processes by which organizations select and ignore information.  
 
Another important insight that the enactment perspective offers is the source of 
change. The enactment perspective does not accept that the organization be regarded 
as reactive sensors to things in the environment. As Follet demonstrates it is difficult 
to pin down the source of change  
As we perform a certain action out thought towards it changes and that 
changes our activity…You may say, “When I talk with Mr. X he always 
stimulates me.” Now it may not be true that Mr. X stimulates everyone; it may 
be that something in you has called forth something in him. ….I never react to 
you but to you-plus-me; or to be more accurate, it is I-plus-you reacting to 
you-plus-me. “I” can never influence “you” because you have already 
influenced me; that is in the very process of meeting, by the very process of 
meeting, we both become something different. It begins even before we meet, 
in the anticipation of meeting. We see this clearly in conferences. Does anyone 
wish to find out the point where the change begins? He never will.( Follet 
(1924) as quoted in Weick, 1995 page 33) 
  Consider the game of twenty questions explained above again. The game had 
an inbuilt accuracy built into it. There was one correct answer and all the person had 
to do was improve his sensemaking from the cues he receives from the questions he 
asks. So accuracy was the motive. We can explain the enactment perspective using a   17
variation suggested by wheeler, (taken from Daft and Weick, 1984). Once the player 
leaves the room so that remaining can choose a word, the game unfolds in a different 
manner. Instead of choosing one word through consensus, everyone thinks of a word 
in mind and answers yes or no to the questions asked by the player in a manner that 
fits both his own reply and all the previous replies. In this variation there are different 
answers that emerge for different questions asked. There is no one correct reality. The 
answer does not exist independent of the player asking questions and the focus shifts 
from accuracy to reasonableness (to be explained in detail below). In this way 
reality/environment is constructed. However, in organizations instead of one 
individual enacting the environment, environments are socially created.  
 
Since cognitive theories expand our view of what environment is composed of, the 
relationship between environment and organization and the source of change, we find 
it a source of useful insights for application to high velocity environments. This is 
compatible with Mintzberg et al (1998) identification of cognitive school with 
unpredictable confusing environment and natural decision making processes as shown 
in the figure below:  
   18
 
 
The above discussion on the three perspectives of environment suggests that it is not 
the substance or properties and parts that are problematic as identified by linear 
adaptive frameworks. It is the existence of the environment as an entity that is 
problematic. The enactment perspective sensitizes us that what the environment is and 
where it is cannot be taken for granted. The environment is located in the minds of the 
managers rather than outside of them. So it is their belief structure that matters in 
analyzing the environment. So instead of taking a stand on which of the three 
perspectives we can use the model suggested by Weick and Daft, 1984 which is based 
on the idea that the organizations vary in their beliefs about environment and their 
intrusiveness into the environment.  
 
A basic premise of the model – that organizations differ systematically in the mode by 
which they interpret the environment – is especially relevant to this study.     
Underlying the interpretive systems model are two constructs, analyzability (termed 
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Source: Mintzberg et al (1998) page 369   19
“assumptions about the environment”) and intrusiveness.  Analyzability is the degree 
to which an organization assumes that the environment is concrete, that events and 
processes are explicit, measurable, and determinant.  Intrusiveness is the thoroughness 
with which an organization seeks feedback about its actions on the environment, 
absorbs this information, and responds. 
 
Dichotomizing analyzability and intrusiveness into ‘high’ and ‘low,’ Daft and Weick 
(1984) create a four-cell typology of interpretive stances (see Figure 1).  The four 
stances are labeled discovering, enacting, conditioned viewing, and undirected 
viewing.   We present examples of firms in mature industries associated with each 
stance.   20
 
FIGURE 1. INTERPRETIVE STANCE TYPOLOGY 
(From Daft & Weick, 1984) 
   Managers:  Managers: 
    Assume the environment is not￿  Assume the environment 
    Analyzable    is not exactly analyzable 
    Rely on limited, soft    Place emphasis on 
   Information    constructing  the 
    Are open to a variety of cues    environment rather than 
 LO
W 
   discovering  it 
    Gather information irregularly,  Experiment, test, simulate 
    Heuristically    Ignore precedent, rules, 
       expectations 
        




 "CONDITIONED  VIEWING"  "DISCOVERING" 
   Managers:     
    Assume the environment is         Managers: 
    Analyzable    Assume the environment 
 HI
GH 
Create standard data collection   is analyzable 
    Procedures    Place emphasis on   21
    Develop interpretation within   detecting  "correct" 
    traditional boundaries    response for each stimulus 
    Do not initiate unusual
routines 
  Use careful probes such as 
    to learn about the environment   market research, focus 
        groups, trend analysis 
   LOW    HIGH 
          
     ORGANIZATIONAL INTRUSIVENESS 
 
1. Discovering Stance.   Organizations with a discovering stance are ideal-form 
creatures of management science.  Such firms value analyzability highly by assuming 
that the environment contains “right answers” that can be detected through the use of 
appropriate probes such as market research and competitive intelligence.  They are 
also highly intrusive, seeking, and processing information that help test casual 
linkages between organizational action and environmental response.  Examples of 
firms with a discovering stance are market research leaders such as Proctor & Gamble 
and Unilever. 
2.  Enacting stance.  Organizations with an enacting stance are highly intrusive, 
valuing experimentation, testing, coercion, bending of rules, and invention like Apple, 
such firms assume that the environment is not so much analyzable as it is enactable.  
Examples of such firms are innovative, risk-taking, and rapid-response firms such as 
3M and Microsoft. 
   22
3.  Conditioned viewing stance.  Organizations with a conditioned viewing stance 
assume the environment is highly analyzable.  Yet they are constrained in their 
intrusiveness.  A good exemplar of this stance is General Motors, which for decades 
was the leading spender on market research; yet it failed to anticipate the rise of the 
economy car in the early 1970s.  Firms with a conditioned viewing stance are usually 
very competent in a particular product or industry segment (such as GM with family 
cars), so much so that their core competence turns into core rigidity.  Xerox is another 
well-known example; after having practically invented the personal computing 
environment, “copier head” top managers killed the development and exploitation of 
valuable in-house research (Smith & Alexander, 1988 as quoted in Anand,Hoffman 
and Novak, 1998). 
 
4. Undirected viewing stance.  Organizations with an undirected viewing stance take a 
rather circumscribed view of the environment by assuming that it is not analyzable 
and cannot be acted upon. This stance is a manifestation of poor leadership and inept 
management.  The Harley-Davidson company was blighted by an undirected viewing 
stance in the late 1970s.  Crippled by the Japanese incursion into the United States 
market, Harley-Davidson was plagued by poor quality, low productivity, excessive 
costs, and hostile labor relations.  Market share in its core competence – the heavy 
motorcycles category – plunged from 78% in 1973 to 30% in 1981 (Reid, 1990).  
Dealers were sending bikes back to the factory in Milwaukee in large numbers.   
Although Harley-Davidson enjoyed high levels of brand loyalty, customers began to 
defect in droves as the company became insensitive to feedback from the 
environment.  This example underscores the point that well known organizations can   23
Let their interpretive stance go weak by becoming less intrusive and assuming that the 
environment is no longer analyzable. (Anand, Hoffman and  Novak 1998 ) 
 
6. What is Noticing and Interpretation under Cognitive Theories 
 
Scanning as defined by Aguilar (1967,p.6) is an “organization’s search for 
information about events and relationships in the outside environment, the knowledge 
of which would assist managers in strategy formulation.”.Daft and Weick (1984) 
define scanning as the process of monitoring the environment and providing 
environmental data to managers. In case of objectivist perspective of environment 
scanning is akin to bracketing some portion for further attention and ignoring others. 
If we regard environment as a stream of experience then scanning would mean 
punctuating this flow of experience and noticing/encoding it. In case of our twenty 
questions example, it refers to deciding the questions to ask. Scanning is concerned 
with data collection. The organization may use formal data collection systems, or 
managers may acquire data about the environment through personal contacts.  
 
Noticing environmental data or information is one key step in coping with changes in 
the environments. Researchers like Starbuck and Milliken (as quoted in Weick, 
1995,p.51) prefer the word noticing to scanning because the former term implies a 
more informal, more involuntary beginning to the process of sense making. Scanning 
looks more deliberate, strategic, more under control of preconceptions, and less open 
to innovation. According to them noticing refers to activities of filtering, classifying 
and comparing whereas sense making refers more to interpretation and the activity of 
determining what the noticed cues mean. It is in the noticing stage that the external   24
environment is directly engaged into. All processes for further processing of the 
stimuli start where noticing ends. Noticing determines whether people even consider 
responding to the environment events. If events are noticed, people make sense of 
them and if events are not noticed they are not available for sensemaking.  (Weick, 
1995,p. 51) 
The other important step is interpretation. Scanning and interpretation are different, 
though they form an almost inseparable part of environmental scanning. 
Interpretations occur after scanning. Data are given meaning. Here the human mind is 
engaged. Perceptions are shared and cognitive maps are constructed. An information 
coalition of sorts is formed. The organization experiences interpretation when a new 
construct is introduced into the collective cognitive map of the organization. 
Organizational interpretation is formally defined as the process of translating events 
and developing shared understanding and conceptual schemes among the members of 
upper management. Interpretation gives meaning to data, but it occurs before 
organizational action(Daft and Weick ,1984). 
Interpretation involves categorization of data or information which involves placing 
stimuli into frameworks (or schemas) to make sense of the stimuli(Sutcliffe 2001). 
An attempt is made to reduce the equivocation in the environmental stimuli.  
 
The cognitive theories have sensitized us to the fact that no issue is inherently 
strategic. Rather, an issue becomes strategic when top management believes that it has 
relevance for organizational performance. Environmental scanning entails focus on 
processes that shape the set of issues that top management sees as strategic. It focuses 
on processes that take place during the early stages of decision making, when issues 
are first identified and diagnosed. As one public policy researcher has stated, "We're   25
talking here not about how issues get decided, nor about how decisions are 
implemented and what impacts they have, but rather how issues come to be issues in 
the first place" (Kingdon, 1990,p. 1).  
 
7. The process of noticing and interpretation 
Lyles and Schwenk (1992) elaborated on the processes by which individual level 
schemata are combined into organizational level knowledge structures and the 
processes by which knowledge structures change in response to environmental 
changes. They suggested that when environmental change invalidates existing 
assumptions organizational members articulate and advocate elements of the new 
knowledge structure. These are then combined through the activities of key decision 
makers (or the dominant coalition) into a new knowledge structure which is 
communicated to the other members of the organization.  
The process is explained in detail below: 
The process of knowing the environment is an ongoing and continuous process. 
Though it has been explained as a linear process, there may be issues at different 
stages in the organization. The model described below complements Garbage can 




Changes in a firm’s environment may be perceived by many members. Once 
members of organizations become aware of environmental information, further 
processing occurs as executives make sense of it and formulate an interpretation that 
provides the basis for decisions and actions. Each member interprets environmental   26
cues in different ways. “Interpretation has the aspects of comprehending, 
understanding, explaining, attributing, extrapolating, and predicting” (Starbuck and 
Milliken, 1988, p. 51 as quoted in Lyles and Schwenk 1992). These people could be 
at any level in the managerial hierarchy. For strategic issues we can rule out the 
possibility of lower level managers getting involved, however, as we shall explain 
below under issue selling, the role of middle level managers’ is crucial in noticing 
environmental stimuli.  
When is it percieved:  
However, when the change begins to affect company performance and when it 
cannot be adequately explained or predicted through the existing knowledge structure, 
it creates a challenge to that existing knowledge structure and creates an interactive 
effect among the organizational participants, the environment, and behavior.  
 
Group processes 
The individuals who noticed the changes now interpret the stimuli either 
themselves or in consultation with others. If found important for the organization they 
initiate the issue selling process, wherein political processes are evoked when 
different coalitions (such as operators, managers, and analysts and support staff) 
within a firm who hold alternative schemas advocate their own positions through such 
mechanisms as task forces and special reports .These different coalitions attempt to 
influence others and to gain the agreement of others about the coalition’s 
interpretation of events (Lyles and Mitroff, 1980).  
The main aim is to bring the issue to the attention of the key decision maker or 
decision makers in the top management team.    27
The individual level processes are still in operation here, for example when other 
members of the organization and the members in the top management team are being 
bought in for supporting a particular issue. However, the activity now is a social one, 
as joint/shared meaning instead of individual one becomes important.  
Changes in the organizational knowledge structure occur as a result of the impact of 
the interpretation of environmental events, results of past organizational actions, the 
influence of the key decision-makers, and the advocacy position of coalitions within 
the firm. The political processes have to do with the negotiating and bargaining that 
takes place to gain support for alternative schemas. Socio-political themes, such as 
credibility and power, have been shown to influence the acceptance of particular 
views (Lyles and Mitroff, 1980).  
 
Organizational mind / Key decision makers and labeling of issue 
Once the key decision-makers sense and interpret changing environmental events, 
they frame them in the problem formulation process as problems, opportunities, or 
crises (Dutton and Jackson, 1987; Lyles and Mitroff, 1980; Mintzberg et  al., 
1976).These decision-makers have a strong influence on the development of the 
organizational knowledge structures since it is primarily they who interpret the 
importance of environmental events and who communicate their view of the 
knowledge structure through speeches and statements.  
It seems likely that the key decision-makers’ schemata closely reflect the collective 
mind of the organization and they influence the attitudes and beliefs of others in the 
organization by communicating and networking .Once the key decision- makers have 
determined that the change challenges the crucial elements of the knowledge   28
structure, they make changes in the knowledge structure and communicate these 
changes to others in the organization.  
 
 
8. How to Improve Noticing and Interpretation 
Often information collected in organizations is either too much, too little, or wrong. 
Evidence from laboratory studies suggest that individual rarely acquire the right 
amount of information before they make decisions (Connolly 1988; Connolly and 
Gilani 1982; Connolly and Serre 1984). They acquire too little information when 
decision stakes are large or too much when stakes are low. Individuals are also not 
able to judge reliably the differential validity of information, nor do they consistently 
acquire information form the cheapest of the available valid sources.( Vodosek and 
Sutcliffe, 2000 :161 ) 
 
 
In enactment perspective environment is a stream of experience. Given the limitations 
of human mind, people must be the noticing/encoding only select set of events. 
However, this encoding is not arbitrary. So if we understand what gets noticed and 
what cues are extracted we can take steps to improve noticing and similarly we can 
improve interpretation.   
What is noticed and what cues are depends on context in two important ways. First 
context affects what is extracted as a cue in the first place; the concept of frame is 
used as shorthand for the structure of context. Second, context also affects how the 
extracted cue is then interpreted. 
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From the social cognition literature (Fiske and Taylor ,1991) it is clear that the things 
people notice are “things that are novel or perceptually figural in context, people or 
behaviors that are unusual or unexpected, behaviors that are extreme and (sometimes) 
negative, and stimuli relevant to our current goals….Our attention also orients us to 
situationally or personally primed categories. Recently, frequently and chronically 
encountered categories are more accessible for use, and they profoundly influence the 
encoding of stimuli” (Fiske and Taylor as quoted in Weick 1995,p.52). 
 
9. Factors Affecting Acquisition of Information  
Research in the area of organizational information processing shows that a myriad of 
factors affect the acquisition, analysis and use of information in an organization 
including individual difference variables and variables related to characteristics of the 
organizations information system, structure, and strategy (Sutcliffe 2001). 
Organizational member’s acquisition and use of information are not only influenced 
by the appropriate normative factors but also by several normatively irrelevant task 
characteristics. These findings indicate that large and costly departures from 
optimality may be frequently found in the acquisition and use of information in the 
real world settings.  
 
The table given below summarizes various cognitive biases and heuristics identified 
in decision making by bounded rational individuals.  
 
Table 1 Selected heuristics and biases 
Heuristic/bias Effects 




Expectations may bias observation of relevant events 
Illusory  correlation  Encourage the belief that unrelated variables are 
correlated 
Law of small 
numbers 
Overestimation of the degree to which small samples 
are representative of the population 
Regression bias  Failure to allow for regression to the mean 
Wishful  thinking  Probabilities of desired outcome are judged to be 
inappropriately high 
Illusion of control  Overestimation of personal control over outcomes 
Logical 
reconstruction 
Logical reconstruction of events which cannot be 
accurately recalled 
Hindsight bias  Overestimation of predictability of past events 
Source: adapted from C.R Schwenk (1988) 
 
In order to improve scanning and interpretation despite the presence of the above 
heuristics and biases, the managers need to be aware of the pitfalls of these heuristics 
and develop a healthy skepticism of what they see and interpret. Here the best 
practices of organizations known as High Reliability Organizations (hereinafter 
referred to as HRO) like Nuclear aircraft carriers, nuclear power generating plants, 
hospital emergency departments can be used. The people in these firms face all 
varieties of surprises but still manage to perform well. The basic feature that these 
firms exhibit compared to other organizations is Mindfulness (term coined by Weick 
and Sutcliffe (2001)). The two important features that can aid the managers in seeing   31
more and interpreting better in the light of the aforementioned heuristics and biases 
are preoccupation with failure and reluctance to simplify interpretation.  
 
Preoccupation to failure  
Kiesler and Sproull (1982) in their essay on problem sensing give the following 
insights 
people attend to and encode salient material –events that are unpleasant 
deviant, extreme, intense, unusual, sudden, brightly lit, colorful, alone, or 
sharply drawn. In the world of organizations, salient information includes 
unanticipated drains on cash flow, new taxes and regulations (unpleasant 
information), predictions of best and worst outcomes (extreme information), 
disruptions of routine and emergencies (intense, unusual, sudden information), 
and publicity and iconoclastic executives (colorful information). The behavior 
and outcomes of competitors, of course, are sharply drawn – a figure against 
ground. 
 
Preoccupation to failure is an attempt to look for such punctuations in experiences 
instead of waiting for the same. This feature is reflected in small things like frequent 
incident reviews, the reporting of errors no matter how inconsequential, and 
employees’ obsession with the liabilities of success. This tendency is evident in 
statements like “there’s nothing as blinding as success” made by Robert D Haas, 
Chairman of Levi Strauss & Company. Any lapse from expectations is treated as a 
symptom of something wrong with the system. Hence close calls and near misses are 
regarded as a kind of failure that reveals potential danger rather than as evidence of 
success. The procedures are often updated after a close call or near miss has been   32
experienced to incorporate new experience and enrich understanding of the 
organization and the environment. Reporting of errors is encouraged even if they 
seem inconsequential or bad news. In these organizations it is made hard for the 
people to hide mistakes of any kind.  
 
Reluctance to simplify interpretations  
Simplifying interpretations refers to following a one size fits all approach. Simple 
interpretations are suitable for simple phenomenon, but when the environment is 
complex, unstable, unknowable, and unpredictable as discussed in the first section 
simplification would constrain vigilance and observation. One needs to see more and 
in order to do this HROs position themselves to see more. Recall the modified twenty 
questions game. The chances of success are maximized if the more questions are 
thought through before asking. People in HROs generally prolong their analysis to 
better grasp the nature of the problems that come up. People are encouraged to 
express different views of the world and it is rare that anybody’s views are dismissed. 
People are not shot down for surfacing information that makes them look like 
skeptics/those who challenge status quo. Questioning is encouraged in meetings. The 
boundary spanners in these organizations have diverse experiences, they cultivate a 
healthy skepticism to received wisdom, and they have negotiation tactics that 
reconcile differences of opinions. (Weick and Sutcliffe, 2001)  
 
 
10. More Insights on Improving Environmental Scanning in High Velocity 
Environments.  
Performance monitoring instead of scanning   33
There is a tradeoff between time-consuming data analysis and planning process and 
speedy decision making. However, this does not mean that the most effective 
organizations forgo analysis of important information as a precursor to decision 
making. Recent studies suggest that organization is high-velocity environments pay 
more attention to performance monitoring than to more traditional scanning activities. 
Organizational scanning provides information about the overall business environment. 
Scanning is critical for planning, strategy formulation, and long-term decision 
making. Performance monitoring, by contrast, provides more specific information 
about an organization’s business situation and whether it is effective in fulfilling its 
goals and meeting the demands of stakeholders (Eisenhardt 1989; Huber 1991). 
Information about a company’s performance relative to competitors, existing 
technologies, and product markets in which the company operates is useful for 
making operational and tactical decisions; is important for uncovering or discovering 
idiosyncratic threats, problems, or trends; and leads to more timely and accurate 
detection of problems and opportunities (D’Aveni 1994; Eisenhardt 1989). This 
enables them to initiate corrective action before crises materialize (Eisenhardt 1989). 
In addition to its salutary effect on problem sensing, performance monitoring can 
positively influence performance indirectly through its effect on trust. Frequent 
interactions enable executives to develop norms of trust that permit quick and reliable 
responses when situations become difficult (Sutcliffe, 2001)  
 
These observations about the way social reality is formed in organizational settings 
suggest a powerful prescription for strategic managers. They must look first to 
themselves and their actions and inactions, and not to “the environment” for 
explanations of their situations, indeed, research on organizational crises reveals that   34
in many cases top managers’ thinking patterns, not external environments, cause 
crises. As Karl Weick advises: If people want to change their environment, they need 
to change themselves and their actions not someone else.....Problems that never get 
solved, never get solved because managers keep tinkering with everything but what 
they do (Weick. 1975, ,p.152 quoted in Weick,1995)).  
Because of the temptation to assign convenient blame, the contributions of strategic 
management research should help managers reflect on the ways in which managers’ 
actions create and sustain their particular organizational realities (Smircich and 
Stubbard 1985 ,p.728)This parallels high reliability organization’s trait of sensitivity 
to operations. 
 
 Sensitivity to operations 
This involves paying close attention to operations, the front line, and the 
imperfections in these features. One must know what the right way is of doing things 
to know what has gone wrong. This feature involves development of collective 
cognitive map of the operations at any one moment by each involved. This is the only 
way near misses can be identified and their causes ascertained. The loopholes in the 
system’s defenses/barriers/safeguards whose potential existed for some time prior to 
the onset of deviations are examined carefully so that operations can be improved. 
HROs are adept at recognizing these “free lessons” that signal development of 
unexpected events through frequent assessments. This requires free sharing of 
information irrespective of the position in the hierarchy. Detailed information is 
provided to everyone on what’s happening in the organization. All people are 
encouraged to speak up. The basic premise is that people who refuse to speak out of   35
fear/ignorance/indifference enact a system that knows less than it needs to know to 
remain effective(Weick and Sutcliffe, 2001).  
 
Accuracy speed tradeoff 
Although the pursuit of information accuracy may have positive benefits such as 
contributing to more innovative decision solutions, it may also have some untoward 
effects in organizations. Specifically, as Weick, Sutcliffe and Obstfeld (1997) suggest, 
the pursuit of accuracy may curtail intraorganizational interaction and communication 
because people may withhold judgments until they can demonstrate that their analysis 
is sound. In complex, partially understood environments like high-velocity 
environments, “norms that favor accuracy may silence the reporting of imprecise 
hunches about anomalies that could cumulate into crisis” (Weick, Sutcliffe and 
Obstfeld 1997: 36).  
 
In the enacted world what drives action is plausibility and not accuracy. Recall the 
example of modified twenty questions game. There is no one correct answer and the 
answer changes as the questions change. Sutcliffe and Weber Klaus, (2003) explored 
the relationships between organizational changes, the accuracy of managers' 
perceptions, and organizational performance. They had expected that initial 
investments in improving the accuracy of senior managers' perceptions would have 
produced increasing returns for a while, flatten out, and eventually decline. The 
reasoning was as follows: - an early investment in accuracy would greatly enhance the 
quality and timeliness of top managers' strategic moves, thus facilitating changes and 
improving performance, but that ever more detailed analysis would make only 
marginal contributions. Eventually, the returns would become negative as the quest   36
for ever greater accuracy consumed resources and distracted managers from initiating 
timely actions. 
Their results showed that the relationship between perceptual accuracy and the 
magnitude of organizational change did indeed follow this inverted U-shaped pattern. 
Initial investments in improving the accuracy of senior managers' perceptions 
triggered more change, but eventually, as improvements in accuracy began to taper 
off, so did the magnitude of change. Eventually, investments in accuracy became, as 
expected, negatively associated with change. The relationship between accuracy and 
performance, however, confounded our expectations. Instead of the inverted U-shaped 
curve we saw between accuracy and change, the relationship between accuracy and 
performance turned out to be linear and negative. When it came to performance, it 
seemed that any extra effort spent on improving the accuracy of top executives' 
knowledge about the environment damaged rather than improved performance. In 
other words, as accuracy decreased, performance got better--a result that seemed 
counterintuitive. 
 
The findings suggest that perceptual accuracy at the very top executive levels is 
actually a source of competitive disadvantage for most firms. The task of leaders is to 
manage ambiguity and to mobilize action, not to store highly accurate knowledge 
about their environment. 
 
Having shown that accuracy does not guarantee competitive advantage, one can turn 
attention to the effects of top executives' interpretive frameworks and focus on 
interpretive orientations, or, in simple terms, mind-sets. An interpretive orientation is 
a propensity to frame new situations in a particular light. As psychologist Karl Weick   37
describes in his 1995 book, Sense making in Organizations, a generalized interpretive 
orientation is a "minimal sensible structure" consistent enough to filter information 
and focus attention but loose enough to allow improvisation and speedy adjustments. 
Interpretive orientations can be compared along a number of dimensions--for 
example, the degree to which events are interpreted as threats versus opportunities.  
 
The authors' research suggests that how accurate senior executives are about their 
competitive environments can indeed be less important for strategy and corresponding 
organizational changes than the way in which they interpret the information about 
their environments. Therefore, investments in shaping those interpretations may 
create a more durable competitive advantage than investments in obtaining and 
organizing more information.  
 
Symmetrical information systems and empowering middle level managers  
Symmetrical information systems are those in which employees are provided with 
mechanisms for dialog with each other, supervisors, and top managers. Asymmetrical 
information system, by contrast, lack mechanisms of dialog. Symmetrical information 
systems may enable employees to have a deeper understanding of their organization’s 
goals, plans, and relationships with key actors in the environment than asymmetrical 
information systems. As a consequence, lower-level employees in symmetrical 
information systems may be better primed to recognize important information than 
employees in asymmetrical ones. Ultimately this higher awareness of important 
information in symmetrical information systems may affect the quality of information 
analysis itself.  
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Providing detailed real time information on what is happening helps in maintaining a 
big picture. An organizations knows more or less than what its individual members 
know (Vodosek and Sutcliffe,2000). 
 
Face to face interaction  
Decision makers in organizations in which performance is monitored continually 
through frequent, mandatory, intense, face-to-face operations meetings, or through 
other mechanisms such as frequent written reports detailing performance targets, 
sense the environment more quickly and accurately (Eisenhardt 1989) 
  
In a changing world, it is not just the old answers that are suspect. It is also the old 
questions. And once people are uncertain what questions to ask, then they are put in 
the position where they have to negotiate some understanding of what they face and 
what a solution would look like. Puzzles now represent both threats and opportunities, 
the same event means different things to different people, and more information will 
not help them. What will help them is a setting where they can argue, using rich data 
pulled from a variety of media, to construct fresh frameworks of action-outcome 
linkages that include their multiple interpretations. The variety of data needed to pull 
off this difficult task are most available in variants of the face to face meeting (Weick 
1995). 
Meetings are sense makers for this reason and they are also one of the main sites 
where requisite variety can be mobilized in the interest of sensing and regulating more 
of the variety that confronts the organization.  
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Improve communication mechanisms 
Donnelin et al (1986) as quoted in Vodosek, and  Sutcliffe,.(2000),were also 
interested in documenting the role of shared meaning in creating organized action. 
They expected that shared meaning would be a precondition to organized action. They 
explored how communication behaviors can produce shared meanings. They found, to 
their surprise, that groups could engage in organized action without having developed 
shared beliefs about taking the action. Communication mechanisms were critical to 
achieving collective action. Such action took place even when organizational 
members held different beliefs, so long as they beliefs were consistent with the same 
organized action.  
 
The above is also important to empower middle and lower level managers. Most of 
the research on information processes in organizations assumes that information is 
readily available for top executives to perceive, pay attention to, scan, or process. 
Traditionally, midlevel managers have been seen as suppliers of information to top 
managers (Thompson, 1967). Also, top managers have been found to receive 
information from external sources such as boards of other companies that they serve 
on, publications targeted to executives, and consultants. With the exception of the 
work by Dutton and Colleagues on how middle managers sell issues to top 
management (Dutton and Ashford, 1993) 
 
There is little recent organizational research that examines how information enters an 
organization or how information gets acquired, who acquires it, and in what form it 
reaches top decision makers. Issue selling is the process by which individuals affect 
others' attention to and understanding of the events, developments, and trends that   40
have implications for organizational performance (Dutton & Ashford, 1993). Because 
no issue is inherently important or strategic, individuals' claims about what matters 
(that is, their issue selling) determine, in part, which change initiatives get activated 
(Dutton & Ashford, 1993). Issue selling shapes an organization's investment of time 
and attention and thereby shapes, in part, the actions and changes that ensue.  
In a pluralistic organizational world, managers coexist with different and competing 
interests and perspectives. Through the issue-selling process, managers push their 
ideas forward to effect change.  
It highlights the social process by which the stimuli residing in an individual 
mind of a member of the organization reaches the collective mind of the 
organization.  
All this requires symmetrical information systems.  
 
Interpretation 
Fundamental to the interpretation process is the categorization of data or 
information which involves placing stimuli into frameworks to make sense of 
the stimuli. While numerous categories are possible, the literature highlights 
“opportunity” and “threat” as two salient general categories used  by decision 
makers when interpreting information in regard to environmental changes, 
events, trends, or developments (Dutton & Jackson, 1987).These general labels 
capture top executive’s beliefs about the potential effects of environmental 
events and trends on the organization more broadly, and may even determine 
those effects because the extent to which top decision makers interpret 
environmental conditions as opportunities or threats predisposes them to 
respond in predictable ways (Dutton and Jackson, 1987).   41
 Here we summarize the results that help in improving interpretation of noticed 
environmental stimuli.  
Opportunities are more likely to be constructed in organizations where multiple 
courses of action are envisioned and favored (Dutton, 1993) or where decision 
makers perceive they have more control. Managers with higher degree of 
discretion are likely to environ many courses of action and to perceive that they 
have a higher degree of control, which means they will be more likely than 
their counterparts with a low degree of discretion to frame environmental 
variations or discontinuities as opportunities.  
 
Managing equivocation 
Bartunek’s (1984) study of ideological and structural change in a religious order is a 
powerful example of how symbolic reframing by organizational leaders can lead to 
fundamental, substantive organizational change. She documents the changes in 
interpretive schemas within this organization and the relationship between interpretive 
change and organizational restructuring. She found that although leadership and 
environmental events are key triggers to organizational change the influence of these 
factors is moderated by the interpretive schemas of the organization. She found that 
their leaders have the most impact is on these interpretive schemas. By providing 
alternative schemas they facilitate change in these schemas and subsequent 
organizational change. 
 
Interpretation characteristics suitable for high velocity environments 
Since managers in high velocity environments are likely to experience equivocation in 
their data, equivocality reduction will have to be resorted to. This can be done through   42
discussion to arrive at a common interpretation or on the basis of action taking to see 
what actually works.  
 
The assembly rules in such organizations should involve fewer rules to guide for 
processing data into collective interpretations. Moreover these should not be enforced 
very strictly.  
 
Organizational level 
Jackson and Dutton (1988) as quoted in Land, (2001) study applied categorization 
theory to managerial interpretation of strategic issues. Categorization theory holds 
that in order for individuals to make sense of their worlds, they form categories in 
their minds under which experiences can be classified and understood. Cognitive 
categorization appears to be fundamental requirement for learning. Jackson and 
Dutton set out to demonstrate that managers would categorize strategic issues as 
potential threats or opportunities. They also attempted to discover the issue 
characteristics that influence how a manager classifies issues one way or another. 
Their evidence suggests that managers did use this categorization scheme and viewed 
threats as negative and opportunities as positive. Threats and opportunities also 
elicited different emotions. Their findings were surprising in that it was not entirely 
clear how issue characteristics map onto these two categories. Managers seem to have 
a negative (threat bias) i.e. they were more likely to interpret issues as threats than 
opportunities. However, issues that were ambiguous might be interpreted as a threat 
or an opportunity. The more control a manager they had over the environment the 
more likely they were to see an ambiguous as an opportunity. Although the basis 
tenets of categorization theory were applicable to managers issue classification it was   43
apparent that the interpretations of managers were complex and that more work was 
needed to determine the factors that influence their interpretations.  
 
Thomas and McDaniel (1990) studied the impact of top management team structure 
on interpretations. This was one of the first studies of managerial interpretations to 
examine the influence of contextual factors. They found that top management team 
that were structured so as to process large amounts of information were more likely to 
label strategic issues positively (i.e. as opportunities). Such team structures were also 
related to higher degrees of information usage and higher perceptions of control over 
issues. Their findings reinforce Jackson and Dutton’s findings that managers who 
perceived more control over the environment were more likely to perceive issues 
positively. The Thomas and McDaniel’s study related the structure of the 
management team to the labeling of strategic issues. This relationship seemed to work 
through processing of large amounts of information and perceiving control over the 
environment. Taken together these findings suggest that managers who are able to 
process information readily (i.e. are not overwhelmed) felt more control over their 
environment and thus perceive strategic issues as possible opportunities for action, not 
threats. The strength of the effects of context in this study versus the strength of 
finding found in Jackson and Dutton study suggested that contextual factors play a 
critical role in determining how managers process information and interpret this 
information.  
 
Thomas et al (1993) performed an empirical study that linked the constructs of 
organizational scanning, interpretation, action, and outcomes. The distinct 
contribution of their work is that it builds a theoretically meaningful framework about   44
cognition in organizations and conducts a comprehensive study to document whether 
the predicted relationships hold empirically. Their study extended the exploration of 
an explanation of managerial interpretations to ask the questions – do these 
interpretations influence strategic change and performance. Similar to prior studies 
they found that high levels of scanning and information usage were associated with 
positive interpretations and perceptions of control regarding strategic issues. These 
positive interpretations and perceptions of control, in turn were associated with 
strategic change which in turn was associated with higher performance.  
 
Action orientation as way to improve interpretation 
  Weick (1995) argue that better information processing may not be so much be 
characterized by the ability to choose between accurate images and misperceptions, 
but rather the ability to enhance plausibility and choose between different potential 
misperceptions.  (Sutcliffe, 2001 ) 
Research examining differences between failing and surviving companies also 
highlights the pitfalls of extensive strategic planning, information gathering, and 
information analysis. For example executives in failing and surviving companies 
appear to differ in the speed with which they update mental models (Barr, Stimpert, 
and Huff 1992). The performance differences can be explained by focusing on the 
possibility that surviving companies engage less in formalized scanning, strategic 
planning and competitive analysis, and more in trial-and-error action. This enables 
better discernment of important trends, threats, and opportunities and facilitates 
second-order learning and changes in executives’ mental models of key cause-effect 
relationships (Lyles and Mitroff 1980)   45
What is important for the current analysis is that formal systems for learning about 
competitive environments (e.g. systems that emphasize long-term strategic planning 
and information analysis) are slow to operate and get bogged down in detail. 
Consequently, these systems often represent the environment as it was, not as it is. 
Moreover, opportunities for interaction and communication are often limited in these 
systems. Thus, decision makers in organizations with more formalized strategic 
planning of information systems are less likely to be aware of current environmental 
information than their counterparts in organizations without such systems.  
As Sutcliffe (2001) argues 
Action taking may be a better mechanism for generating data and for 
instantiating opportunities for dialogue, bargaining, negotiations, and 
persuasion that are essential for developing a good sense of what is going on 
and what to do about it. Further, action and cognition are mutually reinforcing. 
Actions allow for the assessment and reassessment of causal beliefs, which 
subsequently lead executives to undertake new action to test the newly 
asserted relationships. Over time, as supporting evidence mounts, more 
significant changes in beliefs and actions evolve. 
 
Action generates new information and increases opportunities for interaction that can 
help in decision makers modify faulty understandings and update previously held 
inaccurate perceptions. In effect, action facilitates learning. Consequently, decision 
makers in more action-oriented organizations are likely to develop better 
representations of a current environment and to more quickly update existing 
environmental models than their counterparts in organizations that are less action-  46
oriented (Sutcliffe, 2001). Furthermore, action-oriented organizations may adapt more 
quickly to future, changing environments than more sluggish organizations.” 
 
Chaotic Action Is Preferable To Orderly Inaction (Weick 1979)  
The discussions of the enacted environment have emphasized that meaning is 
retrospective and only elapsed experience is available for meaningful interpretation. 
The practical implications of this are that an organization would be in a better position 
to improve its efficiency if the elapsed experience were filled with action rather than 
inaction. Action, when viewed retrospectively, clarifies what the organization is 
doing, what business it is in, and what its projects may be. Inaction, viewed 
retrospectively, is more puzzling and more senseless: there is a greater likelihood for 
bizarre meanings to be attached and for an unhealthy amount of autism to be 
introduced. Action, in other words, provide tangible items that can be attended to.  
In the absence of actions, any act of reflection is directed toward relatively unfilled 
periods of lived experience. This means that to find a filled period of action that can 
be made sensible, the reflection pushes further back in time and fixates on more dated 
experience. Since that experience is even farther out of touch with current happenings, 
the likelihood of misinterpretation is increased.  
 
Action orientation means thinking of mitigation rather than anticipation. The mindset 
is of cure rather than prevention. Prevention is not possible because it is impossible to 
anticipate every situation and condition and provide for the same. So advance 
information on how to get out of a situation is often in short supply. Due to this 
people need to initiate action before they could think through all the possible 
implications of their actions. This delivers result because action enables them to gain   47
experience and a clearer picture of what they are treating. Unlike anticipation, which 
encourages people to think and then act, action orientation encourages people to act 
while thinking or to act in order to think more clearly.( Weick and Sutcliffe, 2001 
,p.69 -70) 
 
Cognitively complex top management team  
Considering the need to maintain alignment between managerial structure and 
environmental demands, Chandler (1990) and Prahlad and Bettis (1986) observe that 
limited information processing abilities at the headquarters level can constrain the 
performance of companies. This constraint can be addressed by executives by 
increasing the cognitive capacity of their top management team such that the team’s 
internal complexity is sufficient relative to its environment (Ashby 1956). In fact, the 
definition of cognitive complexity entails the two elements that form the key to 
adaptive strategy: differentiation, defined in cognitive terms as the ability to see 
multiple dimensions of situations and integration, the capacity to make connections 
among those dimensions (Harvey, Hunt, Schroder 1961 as quoted in Wells and Bantel 
2000) 
 
Because of their divergent capabilities, cognitively complexity individuals have been 
found to be creative (McGill, Johnson, and Bantel 1993). Higher cognitive complexity 
should therefore enhance capacity to recognize the relevance of seemingly unrelated 
cues from multiple aspects of the environment. Such creativity may yield two key 
advantages: the competitive variety necessary in complex environments, and the 
innovation essential in resource-scarce environments. In other words, not only should 
this cognitive capacity improve ability to plan for multiple strategic contingencies, but   48
it should also foster development of the qualitatively new ideas necessary to achieve 
innovation.  
In addition, because of their integrative capabilities, cognitively complex individuals 
have been found to process information more quickly and flexibly than others (Lee, 
1994, as quoted in Wells and Bantel 2000). Thus cognitive complexity at the team 
level as well should be associated with the ability to make connections among the 
disparate elements of the environment quickly. Such teams should be able to effect 
t6he swift changes in company strategy necessary in dynamic environments.  
Although member of top management teams are likely to have relatively high levels 
of cognitive complexity as individuals, they are subject to inherent limits in 
information processing capacity. Therefore, the key to sustaining adequate strategic 
decision making capability in demanding environment may be to enhance the 
cognitive complexity of the top management teams as a whole. Research to date has 
focused on two primary methods of enhancing the cognitive complexity of decision 
making teams. First, the composition of the team may be expanded in order to 
broaden the group’s access to relevant information. Second the team may employ 
processes that facilitate the integration of these differentiated views.  
Potential sources of cognitive diversity include demographic heterogeneity in factors 
such as age, length of service in an organization as well as specifically within a given 
team, functional experience, and academic major (Bantel and Jackson 1989). 
Diversity can have costs, however. For example, groups with the diverse membership 
conducive to strategic differentiation may experience greater difficulty 
communicating (Roberts and O’Reilley 1979) as well as have lower satisfaction and 
higher turnover (Pfeffer 1983).   49
It appears that teams may need integrating processes in order to capitalize on diverse 
compositions. Teams facing ambiguity seem to function better when leaders pay 
scrupulous attention to member inputs (Korsgaard, Schweiger, and Sapiencza 1995), 
as well as when individuals listen carefully to each other (Weick and Roberts 1993).  
 
Conclusion 
Firms in IT industry, telecommunication industry face a difficult challenge of 
adapting quickly in fast changing, i.e. high velocity environments. In these industries 
decisions must be made and action taken in minutes rather than months. Time to think 
deeply, to analyze thoroughly, to mull and ponder, has become an unfulfilled wish. As 
a result, more and more organizations and individual in them are thrust into what is, 
for them, unchartered territory: decision making under tremendous time pressure and 
without adequate information. Errors ranging from missed opportunities to public 
relations disaster abound. This paper suggests that the cognitive perspective of 
environment will help managers deal with high velocity environment. Research in this 
field helps to arrive at some ways to improve noticing and interpretation leading to 
decision making in the organization. 
  Preoccupation to failure 
  Reluctance to simplify interpretations 
  Performance monitoring instead of scanning 
  Accuracy speed tradeoff 
  Symmetrical information systems and empowering middle level managers 
  Face to face interaction 
  Improve communication mechanism 
  Interpretation   50
  Managing Equivocation 
  Organizational Levels Action Orientations a way to improve interpretation 
  Chaotic action rather than inaction 
  Cognitively complex top management team 
Further work is required to explore empirically the application of these suggestions in 
high velocity environment. 
Moreover, there are certain inherent contradictions in the cognitive view of the 
environment where the emphasis is on the interpretation managers put on what they 
perceive and the environments they themselves construct. In such a view, the idea that 
firms should adapt to their environment seems to be potentially erroneous, since firms 
themselves create the environment. If the environment were merely a social construct 
one might well view attempts at objective analysis of the environment as redundant, 
but the environment that surrounds a company however can play a critical role in the 
firm’s success or failure. It is thus possible to err too far in the direction of 
considering the environment as a relative and not absolute concept (Pitkethly, 
2003).Those who prefer metaphor to reality quote Weick’s story of soldiers lost in the 
Alps who find their way to safety aided by a map of Pyrenees(Weick1990, 1995). 
This might indicate towards a bias to wards preserving the only stories of  wrong map 
users who survive. One has to concede therefore that an ability to understand the 
reality and implications of one’s surrounding environment clearly and not through 
some darkened glass is essential (Pitkethly, 2003). 
Hence, cognitive perspective should be viewed as complimentary to traditional 
approaches rather than a substitute to them. For most managers, interpreting the signs 
of the times and the implications for their organizations correctly is crucial and if they 
fail to analyze the organizations environment correctly, it will be difficult to build     51
sound strategies for change. As Pitkethly(2003) puts that it is after all better to start a 
journey with an accurate and appropriate map, to hold it the right way up and 
understand where one is on it than use any map, which like some medieval 
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